Abstract:
The open nature of
the wireless medium leaves it vulnerable to intentional
interference attacks, typically referred to as jamming. This intentional
interference with wireless transmissions can be used as a launchpad for
mounting Denial-of-Service attacks on wireless networks. Typically, jamming
has been addressed under an external threat model. However, adversaries
with internal knowledge of protocol specifications and network secrets can
launch low-effort jamming attacks that are difficult to detect and counter. In
this work, we address the problem of selective jamming attacks in wireless
networks. In these attacks, the adversary is active only for a short period of
time, selectively targeting messages of high importance. We illustrate the
advantages of selective jamming in terms of network performance degradation
and adversary effort by presenting two case studies; a selective attack on TCP
and one on routing.We show that selective jamming attacks can be launched
by performing real-time packet classification at the physical layer. To mitigate
these attacks, we develop three schemes that prevent real-time packet
classification by combining cryptographic primitives with physical-layer
attributes. We analyze the security of our methods and evaluate their
computational and communication overhead.
interference attacks, typically referred to as jamming. This intentional
interference with wireless transmissions can be used as a launchpad for
mounting Denial-of-Service attacks on wireless networks. Typically, jamming
has been addressed under an external threat model. However, adversaries
with internal knowledge of protocol specifications and network secrets can
launch low-effort jamming attacks that are difficult to detect and counter. In
this work, we address the problem of selective jamming attacks in wireless
networks. In these attacks, the adversary is active only for a short period of
time, selectively targeting messages of high importance. We illustrate the
advantages of selective jamming in terms of network performance degradation
and adversary effort by presenting two case studies; a selective attack on TCP
and one on routing.We show that selective jamming attacks can be launched
by performing real-time packet classification at the physical layer. To mitigate
these attacks, we develop three schemes that prevent real-time packet
classification by combining cryptographic primitives with physical-layer
attributes. We analyze the security of our methods and evaluate their
computational and communication overhead.
Modules:-
1. Network module
2. Real Time Packet Classification
3. Selective Jamming
Module
4. Strong Hiding Commitment Scheme (SHCS)
5. Cryptographic Puzzle Hiding Scheme (CPHS)
No comments:
Post a Comment